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We present a fake-signal-and-cheating attack strategy for the dishonest agent in quantum secret
sharing (QSS) to steal the information of the other agents’ fully and freely. It is found that almost
all the QSS protocols existing, such as the two famous QSS protocols, the Hillery-Buzˇek-Berthiaume
[Phys. Rev. A 59, 1829 (1999)] and the Karlsson-Koashi-Imoto [Phys. Rev. A 59, 162 (1999)],
can be eavesdropped freely if the process for the eavesdropping check is accomplished with the
cooperation of the dishonest agent. He can sends a fake signal to the other agents after intercepting
the original photons and storing them. His action can be hidden with entanglement swapping and
cheating when the photons are chosen as the samples for checking eavesdropping. Finally, we present
a possible improvement of these QSS protocols’ security with decoy photons.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Bz, 03.65.Ud, 89.70.+c
Quantum information, an ingenious application of
quantum mechanics within the field of information has
attracted a lot of attention [1, 2]. In particular almost
all the branches of quantum communication have been
developed quickly since the original protocol was pro-
posed by Bennett and Brassard (BB84) [3] in 1984, such
as quantum key distribution (QKD) [4, 5, 6, 7], quantum
secure direction communication [8, 9, 10], quantum se-
cret sharing [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22,
23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30], and so on. QKD provides
a secure way [2] for creating a private key between two
remote parties, say Bob and Charlie. With a private key,
most of the goals in classical secure communication can
be accomplished. For example, a classical secret message
can be transmitted securely by using classical one-time
pad crypto-system with a private key.
In a secret sharing [31], a boss, say Alice, has two
agents, Bob and Charlie who are at remote places. Alice
hopes that the agents can carry out her instruction (the
messageMA), but she doubts that one of them (not more
than one) may be dishonest and he will do harm to her
belongings if the dishonest one can deal with it indepen-
dently. Moreover, Alice does not know who the dishonest
one is. For the security of the secret message MA , Alice
splits it into two pieces,MB andMC , and then she sends
them to Bob and Charlie, respectively. The two agents
can read out the message MA = MB ⊕MC if and only
if they cooperate, otherwise none of them can obtain an
useful information. QSS is the generalization of classical
secret sharing into quantum scenario and has progressed
quickly in recent years [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19,
20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30]. It provides
a secure way for sharing not only classical information
[11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24], but
also quantum information [25, 26, 27, 28]. In the latter,
the sender, Alice will send an unknown quantum state
to her m agents and one of them can recover it with the
help of the others [27]. Now, QSS has also been studied
in experiment [29, 30]. In general, QSS is by far more
complex than QKD as the dishonest agent, a powerful
eavesdropper, has the chance to hide his eavesdropping
with cheating.
Almost all the QSS protocols existing can be attributed
to one of the two types, the collective eavesdropping-
check one and the individual eavesdropping-check one.
The feature of the QSS protocols based on a collective
eavesdropping check is that the process of the eavesdrop-
ping check can be completed only with the cooperation
of the dishonest agent. That is, the boss Alice should
require the dishonest agent to publish his outcomes of
the samples for checking eavesdropping or his operations
on them. Otherwise, she and the honest one cannot ac-
complish the process. The typical models are the two
famous QSS protocols, the two pioneers, the Hillery-
Buzˇek-Berthiaume 1999 (HBB99) [11] and the Karlsson-
Koashi-Imoto (KKI) [12]. In contrast, in the individ-
ual eavesdropping-check QSS protocols, the eavesdrop-
ping check between the boss Alice and the honest agent
need not resort to the information published by the dis-
honest one. In other words, Alice and the honest agent
can analyze the error rate of their samples independent
on the dishonest one. Typical such QSS protocols are
the ones presented in Refs. [23, 24]. As the security
of a QSS protocol is based on the error rate analysis of
the samples chosen by the parties of the communication,
the dishonest agent can obtain all the information about
other agents’ if his eavesdropping does not introduce the
errors in the samples. In fact, almost all the QSS proto-
cols [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22] based on
the collective eavesdropping check can be eavesdropped
fully and freely with a cheat if he has the capability of
performing entanglement swapping [32] and storing the
2quantum states.
In this paper, we will introduce a fake-signal-and-
cheating attack on the QSS protocols [11, 12, 13, 14,
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22] based on the collective
eavesdropping check. It will be shown that the dishonest
agent can steal all the information of the other agents’
freely and fully with entanglement swapping and cheat-
ing. Moreover, we present a possible improvement of
those QSS protocols’ security with some decoy photons.
We limit our discuss in the two famous QSS protocols,
HBB99 [11] and KKI [12]. For the other protocols, the
principle is same as them with or without a little modi-
fication.
Same as that in HBB99 QSS protocol [11], the
Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) triplet that Alice
prepares is in the state
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉)ABC ,
=
1√
2
[(|+ x〉A|+ x〉B + | − x〉A| − x〉B)|+ x〉C
+(|+ x〉A| − x〉B + | − x〉A|+ x〉B)| − x〉C
=
1√
2
[(|+ y〉A| − y〉B + | − y〉A|+ y〉B)|+ x〉C
+(|+ y〉A|+ y〉B + | − y〉A| − y〉B)| − x〉C , (1)
where |0〉 and |1〉 are the two eigenvectors of the operator
z (for example, the spin of a photon along the z direc-
tion), and | ± x〉 and | ± y〉 are those for the operators x
and y, i.e.,
|+ x〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), |+ y〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ i|1〉),
| − x〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉), | − y〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − i|1〉).(2)
The principle of the HBB99 QSS protocol [11] in the
simple case can be described as follows.
The boss Alice prepares a GHZ triplet in the state
|Ψ〉ABC = 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉)ABC and sends the photons
B and C to her two agents, Bob and Charlie, respectively,
and keeps the photon A. All the three parties choose
randomly the measuring basis (MB) x or y to measure
their photons. They repeat their quantum communica-
tion until they obtain an enough large set of outcomes for
generating the private key KA = KB ⊕ KC . Here KA,
KB and KC are the keys obtained by Alice, Bob and
Charlie, respectively. Then they publish the information
about their MBs. When they all choose the MB x or
two choose the MB y and the other one chooses the MB
x, they retain the corresponding outcomes for generat-
ing their private key, otherwise they discard them. From
the Eq.(1), one can see that their outcomes retained are
correlated. In other words, any two parties can deduce
the outcome of the other if they cooperate. For checking
eavesdropping, Alice chooses randomly a large subset of
the outcomes obtained by the three parties to analyze
its error rate. That is, Alice requires Bob and Charlie
announce their outcomes on the samples in public. If the
error rate is lower than the threshold value, they keep
the outcomes for distilling the private key KA.
As pointed out in Ref. [12], if QSS protocol is secure
for the dishonest agent, it is secure for any eavesdropper.
In essence, Alice requires the dishonest agent, say Bob
publish his outcomes of the samples in the process for
checking eavesdropping in HBB99 QSS protocol. Just
his process makes Bob have the chance for hiding his
eavesdropping with cheating. Now let us introduce the
fake-signal-and-cheating attack on HBB99 protocol. It
includes two steps.
(1) Bob replaces the original photon C with a fake
photon C′. That is, Bob intercepts the photon C which is
sent from Alice to Charlie, and stores it. He sends a fake
photon C′ in the Bell state |φ+〉B′C′ = 1√
2
(|0〉B′ |0〉C′ +
|1〉B′ |1〉C′) to Charlie and keeps the photon B′. The
process is repeated until the parties stop the process for
transmitting the photons. Bob does not measure the
photons B, C and B′ until Alice and Charlie publishes
the MBs for their photons.
(2) Bob cheats the other parties when a GHZ triplet is
chosen by Alice as a sample for checking eavesdropping.
In detail, Bob first performs a Bell-state measurement
on the photons B′ and C, and then hides the difference
between the state of the quantum system composed of
the photons A, B and C′ and the original state |Ψ〉 by
publishing a fake information with a cheat.
|Ψ〉 ⊗ |φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉)ABC
⊗ 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)B′C′
=
1
2
√
2
[(|000〉+ |111〉)ABC′|φ+〉CB′
+(|000〉 − |111〉)ABC′ |φ−〉CB′
+(|001〉+ |110〉)ABC′ |ψ+〉CB′
+(|001〉 − |110〉)ABC′ |ψ−〉CB′ ], (3)
where
∣
∣ψ±
〉
=
1√
2
(|0〉 |1〉 ± |1〉 |0〉), (4)
∣
∣φ±
〉
=
1√
2
(|0〉 |0〉 ± |1〉 |1〉). (5)
That is, Bob can deduce the difference between the state
of the system |Ψ〉ABC′ and the original state |Ψ〉ABC ac-
cording to his outcomes with the Bell-state measurement
on photons B′ and C. He can hide the difference by
publishing a fake information with a cheat.
|Ψ〉1 ≡ 1√
2
(|000〉 − |111〉)ABC′
=
1
2
[(|+ x〉| − x〉+ | − x〉|+ x〉)AB |+ x〉C′
+(|+ x〉|+ x〉+ | − x〉| − x〉)AB | − x〉)C′ ]
3=
1
2
[(|+ y〉|+ y〉+ | − y〉| − y〉)AB|+ x〉C′
+(|+ y〉| − y〉+ | − y〉|+ y〉)AB| − x〉C′ ], (6)
|Ψ〉2 ≡ 1√
2
(|001〉+ |110〉)ABC′
=
1
2
[(|+ x〉|+ x〉+ | − x〉| − x〉)AB |+ x〉C′
−(|+ x〉| − x〉+ | − x〉|+ x〉)AB | − x〉)C′ ]
=
1
2
[(|+ y〉| − y〉+ | − y〉|+ y〉)AB|+ x〉C′
−(|+ y〉|+ y〉+ | − y〉| − y〉)AB| − x〉C′ ], (7)
|Ψ〉3 ≡ 1√
2
(|001〉 − |110〉)ABC′
=
1
2
[(|+ x〉| − x〉+ | − x〉|+ x〉)AB |+ x〉C′
−(|+ x〉|+ x〉+ |+ x〉|+ x〉)AB | − x〉)C′ ]
=
1
2
[(|+ y〉|+ y〉+ | − y〉| − y〉)AB|+ x〉C′
−(|+ y〉| − y〉+ | − y〉|+ y〉)AB| − x〉C′ ]. (8)
From Eqs.(1), (3) and Eqs.(6)-(8), one can see that
Bob can hide his eavesdropping by flipping his outcomes
when he obtains the outcomes of the Bell-state measure-
ments |φ−〉 and |ψ−〉 whether he chooses the MB x or y.
As Alice and Charlie cannot detect this eavesdropping,
Bob can measure the other photons transmitted from Al-
ice to Charlie after all the parties published their MBs
for their photons. In this way, Bob can obtain all the in-
formation about Charlie’s outcomes with single-photon
measurements, i.e., KC . With his key KB, Bob can read
out the secret message sent by Alice without cooperating
with Charlie as he obtains the key KA fully and freely.
With this fake-signal-and-cheating attack strategy, the
dishonest agent can eavesdrop freely and fully the in-
formation of the other agent in KKI QSS protocol
[12]. The important difference between HBB99 pro-
tocol [11] and KKI protocol [12] is that the quan-
tum signal prepared by the boss Alice is a two-
qubit maximally entangled state, one of the four
states {|ψ+〉BC , |φ−〉BC , |Ψ+〉BC , |Φ−〉BC}. Here |Ψ+〉 =
1√
2
(|φ−〉+ |ψ+〉) and |Φ−〉 = 1√
2
(|φ−〉 − |ψ+〉). The pho-
tons B and C are the particles sent from Alice to Bob
and Charlie, respectively. In the quantum communica-
tion, Bob and Charlie choose randomly the MBs x and
z to measure their photons received. After an enough
set of outcomes is produced, the three parties compare
their MBs and keeps those in which their MBs are corre-
lated. They check the eavesdropping by picking up some
samples from their outcomes.
Same as the case that the dishonest agent eavesdrops
the quantum communication in HBB99 QSS protocol,
Bob also prepares a fake entangled state |φ+〉B′C′ and
replaces the original photon C sent from Alice to Bob
with the photon C′. Bob stores the photons B and C.
He measures them after the parties publish their MBs
for their photons. Suppose that the original state of the
sample chosen by the three parties is |Ψ′〉BC = α|00〉BC+
β|01〉BC+γ|10〉BC+δ|11〉BC (|α|2+|β|2+|γ|2+|δ|2 = 1).
Bob can hide his action with entanglement swapping and
some a local unitary operation on his photon B as
|Ψ′〉BC ⊗ |φ+〉B′C′ = (α|00〉BC + β|01〉BC + γ|10〉BC + δ|11〉BC)⊗ 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)B′C′
=
1
2
[(α|00〉+ β|01〉+ γ|10〉+ δ|11〉BC′)|φ+〉CB′ + (α|00〉 − β|01〉+ γ|10〉 − δ|11〉BC′)|φ−〉CB′
+(α|01〉+ β|00〉+ γ|11〉+ δ|10〉BC′)ψ+〉CB′ + (α|01〉 − β|00〉+ γ|11〉 − δ|10〉BC′)|ψ−〉CB′ ].
That is, Bob can easily reconstruct the original entan-
gled state |Ψ′〉BC prepared by Alice when it is chosen
for checking eavesdropping. He need only perform the
local unitary operation U0, U1, U2 or U3 on his photon
B according to the result of the Bell-state measurement
on the photons C and B′ is |ψ−〉, |ψ−〉, |φ−〉 or |φ+〉,
respectively. Here
U0 = |0〉 〈0|+ |1〉 〈1| , U1 = |0〉 〈1| − |1〉 〈0| ,
U2 = |1〉 〈0|+ |0〉 〈1| , U3 = |0〉 〈0| − |1〉 〈1| . (9)
In fact, almost all the QSS protocols [11, 12, 13, 14,
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22], in which the eavesdropping
check is complete with the cooperation of the dishonest
one whether the protocol is based on one-way direction
quantum communication or two-way one, can be eaves-
dropped freely and fully. The principle is same as those
for eavesdropping the HBB99 [11] and the KKI [12] QSS
protocols with or without a little modification.
For improving the security of this kind of QSS proto-
cols [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22], Alice
should provide a process for checking eavesdropping with-
out the cooperation of the dishonest agent. In a simple
case, Alice can insert some decoy photons in the quantum
signal sent to each agent. As the process for analyzing
their error rate needs not the other participants except
for the one who received the decoy photons, the action
of the eavesdropping done by the dishonest one will be
detected. Let us use the HBB99 QSS protocol as an ex-
4ample for describe the principle of the way for improving
its security. In detail, Alice prepares some decoy photons
which are randomly in the states {|+x〉, |−x〉, |+y〉, |−y〉}
and then replaces the photonsB and C in the GHZ triplet
|Ψ〉ABC with the decoy photons some a probability 1−p,
similar to the QKD protocol in Ref. [7]. After the parties
announce their MBs for their measurements on their pho-
tons, Alice picks up the outcomes of the decoy photons
as the samples for checking eavesdropping. Even though
half of the decoy photons will be discarded as the MBs
chosen by the agents and Alice is not correlated, same as
BB84 QKD protocol [3], the process for checking eaves-
dropping requires only one of the agents cooperate with
Alice to analyze the error rate of each subset of the decoy
photons, which does not give the chance to the dishonest
agent for eavesdropping the information of another agent
freely.
The decoy photons can be prepared with another ideal
single-photon source. Also they can be prepared by mea-
suring some of the photons in the GHZ triplet |Ψ〉. That
is, Alice can performs the single-photon measurements on
the photons B and C with the MB x or y, and the pho-
ton A can be prepared to a state needed by Alice. The
advantage of the way for preparing the decoy photons is
that Alice need not resort to another ideal single-photon
source. The disadvantage is that Alice maybe waste some
of the GHZ triplets.
In summary, we have present a fake-signal-and-
cheating attack for the dishonest agent to eavesdrop al-
most all the QSS protocols [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18,
19, 20, 21, 22] in which the process of checking eavesdrop-
ping has to resort to his cooperation. With this attack,
the dishonest one can obtain the information of another
agent freely and fully. Moreover, we discuss a possible
way for improving the security of this kind of QSS pro-
tocols.
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